# Perceptual Particularity from a Phenomenological Perspective

## CHEN, Kuei-Chen

Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica

Address: No. 128, Sec. 2, Academia Rd., Nankang, Taipei 11529, R.O.C.

E-mail: ckueichen@gmail.com

## Abstract

The paper considers how phenomenologically-minded philosophers should think about the phenomenon Susanna Schellenberg (2016) calls *perceptual particularity*: in perception, we experience objects in their particularity. For example, if I see a pumpkin, I do not simply see the properties it shares with other objects, such as orange and roundness. What I see is a particular pumpkin that has all these properties. Much work has been done to investigate the phenomenon, but relatively few philosophers

have addressed the concern of this paper: how should those sympathetic with Husserlian phenomenology approach perceptual particularity? I will explore this issue by engaging with two recent Husserlian accounts of perceptual particularity, i.e. those defended by A. D. Smith (2008) and Walter Hopp (2011). Both of them focus on a kind of perceptual particularity that Schellenberg describes as *semantic*. I will argue that this is not the best use of the theoretical resources offered by their theories. The Husserlian ideas invoked by Smith and Hopp are more fruitful when they are applied to a different kind of perceptual particularity, which Schellenberg describes as *phenomenological*. The nature of phenomenological particularity is itself a complex issue, and I shall argue that a satisfactory analysis of it can be formulated on the basis of Hopp's Husserlian theory.

# Perceptual Particularity from a Phenomenological Perspective*

## I. Introduction

The paper considers how phenomenologically-minded philosophers should think about the phenomenon Susanna Schellenberg (2016) calls *perceptual particularity*: in perception, we experience objects in their particularity. If I see a pumpkin, I do not simply see the properties it shares with other objects, such as orange and roundness. What I see is a particular pumpkin that has all these properties. Contrast this with a case in which I am asked to compile a list of round things. It might strike me that pumpkins are round, so I begin to think about pumpkins. In that case, however, I won't be thinking about pumpkins *qua* particulars. It doesn't matter which pumpkins I have in mind. And even if I do have certain pumpkins in mind, it doesn't matter whether those pumpkins really exist. Therefore, the kind of particularity we find in perception can be absent in many other mental states. It is philosophically significant to ask how exactly we should make sense of such particularity.

Much recent work in philosophy of mind has been done on this topic. My concern in this paper is nonetheless more circumscribed: I shall only

focus on recent work on this topic in the phenomenological tradition. In particular, I am interested in how those sympathetic with Husserlian phenomenology should approach the issue of perceptual particularity. Two notable attempts made in such a theoretical context are those by A. D. Smith (2008) and Walter Hopp (2011). As I see it, their views not only advance our understanding of perceptual particularity but also show the relevance of Husserlian ideas to contemporary debates.

Problems arise, however, if we follow Schellenberg and distinguish between two kinds of perceptual particularity. Roughly, one's perceptual experience is *phenomenologically particular* if the perceived object appears as a particular in one's experience.[1] By contrast, one's experience is *semantically particular* if the perceived object determines, at least partially, the representational content of one's experience. For example, suppose I am looking at a pumpkin in my room and Moritz is looking at one in his. From the first-person perspective, both of us seem to see a particular. This means that our experiences are phenomenologically particular. But if our experiences have the same content, then our experiences are not semantically particular.

Both Smith and Hopp aim to establish the semantic particularity of perception. However, I believe that this is not the best use of the theoretical resources offered by their theories. Their arguments cannot secure their desired conclusion – or so I shall argue. Against Smith, I will argue that his

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[1] I will call anything a mental state is about the "object" of the state. If it is possible for us to perceive universals, then there are experiences whose objects are universals. Therefore, it is not trivially true that any object of perception appears as a particular. Alternatively, one could reserve the term "objects" for what are represented and use such terms as "entities" or "individuals" to denote items in one's ontology. Those taking this approach can then say that particulars and universals are both entities or individuals that might function as objects. I thank an anonymous referee for asking me to address this.

argument relies on a notion that is suspicious from a phenomenological perspective. Against Hopp, I will present a thought experiment that poses problems for his view. The conclusion I hope to draw, therefore, is that there are no good phenomenological reasons to affirm the semantic particularity of perception. But this doesn't mean that Husserlian ideas are irrelevant to the issue of perceptual particularity – it's just that they mainly contribute to our understanding of *phenomenological* particularity, not *semantic* particularity. I will argue that the nature of phenomenological particularity is itself a complex issue and that a satisfactory analysis of it can be developed on the basis of Hopp's Husserlian theory.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, I will present Schellenberg's distinction in a more precise manner. I will also relate the distinction to Hopp's theory of perception, which provides a framework for subsequent discussion. Section III evaluates Smith's and Hopp's defenses of the thesis that perception is semantically particular. After making a case for the claim that their arguments are unsuccessful, I turn to Section IV, which focuses on phenomenological particularity. The section begins with an argument that phenomenological particularity is an important topic in its own right. After that, I invoke Hopp's theory and the insights from some other scholars to suggest an account of phenomenological particularity.

## II. Setting the Stage

### A. Schellenberg's Distinction

Let's begin by examining Schellenberg's distinction. As noted above, she argues that there are two kinds of perceptual particularity: pheno-

menological and semantic particularity.[2] On the one hand, a phenomeno-logically particular state is one in which "it seems to the subject that there is a particular present" (Schellenberg 2016: 28). On the other hand, a semantically particular state is one whose content is "constituted" by a particular (Schellenberg 2016: 40). Schellenberg maintains that a pheno-menologically particular state need not be semantically particular, and one of her examples is the experience of after-images. In such an experience, one seems to experience color patches, but the content of one's experience is presumably not constituted by the color patches. The color patches are not real, thus incapable of constituting anything ( Schellenberg 2016: 33).

But what exactly does it mean to say that the content of a perceptual experience is constituted by a particular? Schellenberg suggests several ways of interpreting the claim but isn't committed to any of them (Schellenberg 2016: 26 fn. 3). For my purposes, I will take the claim to mean what Hopp's thesis of *object determination* (OD) says: "Necessarily, if two experiences have the same content, then they (re)present the same object." (Hopp 2011: 173) On this conception of semantic particularity, we can think of Schellenberg's example of after-images along the following lines. Even if two experiences of after-images bear the same content, there isn't any object that they can both represent. There are only two

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possibilities in this case: either the experiences fail to represent any object, or the after-images they represent fail to be identical (there isn't any good criterion of sameness that can be applied to after-images). It follows that the experiences are phenomenologically particular but not semantically particular.

I will say a bit more about OD when summarizing Hopp's theory in Section II. B. Before we proceed, however, a comment on the notion of contents is in order. In this paper, I only focus on what David Chalmers calls *phenomenal content*: "a representational content C of a perceptual experience E is a phenomenal content if and only if necessarily, any experience with the phenomenal character of E has representational content C" (Chalmers 2006: 50-51). In other words, any representational contents capable of varying independently of phenomenal characters are irrelevant to this paper. For example, suppose one endorses an information-based theory of contents along the lines of Fred Dretske's (1981) and further affirms the claim that two experiences of different objects can nevertheless carry the same information. Given the focus of this paper, the theory that results this way could still be considered compatible with the claim that perception is semantically particular—this is the case insofar as one doesn't make the additional claim that the information carried by an experience is fixed by the experience's phenomenal character.

## B. Hopp's Husserlian Theory of Perception

In a series of works, Hopp has developed a nuanced Husserlian view about perception (Hopp 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012). Since his theory provides a framework for much of the discussion below, I shall present the outline of the theory in this section. Given its Husserlian inspirations, Hopp's

theory stresses the fact that perception represents more than what is strictly visible. To illustrate the idea, imagine a scene that can be found in horror stories. I saw a hand in a lake. In an attempt to pull the drowning person out of the water, I immediately grabbed the hand, only to find out that it's a severed hand. Now we could ask: when I perceived the hand, did I perceive the hand as a severed hand? Presumably not. The hand appeared to me as attached to a human body below the water surface, even though what was below the water surface wasn't really visible to me. If so, to properly describe my initial visual experience, we should say that it represented both a visible part (i.e. the hand) and an occluded part (i.e. the body) of a person.[3]

In Hopp's Husserlian terminology, the component of my experience that represented the hand was its *intuitive content*; by contrast, the body was represented by the *horizonal content* of my experience (Hopp 2011: 189). A useful way to think about horizonal contents is to understand it in terms of expectations. One has expectations not only about what the presently perceived object might look like from another perspective but also about what might show up at the next moment. Hence, horizonal contents can also be directed at the future (Hopp 2011: 56).[4] If I see a wrestler charging at his opponent, the horizonal contents of my experience

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[3] I chose the example of the hand for its vividness, but there is nothing special about it. For a more mundane example, see the discussion of intuitive fulfillment in section III.A.

[4] Hopp uses such terms as "anticipate" and "expect" in describing examples of horizonal contents, but he seems to think that they are at best approximations. One of the concerns he has about understanding such contents in terms of expectations is that it gets things backwards – horizonal contents are components of experiences, and one acquires expectations by undergoing experiences, not the other way around (Hopp, personal communication, September 2019). I will also mention some of his other concerns in this paragraph. All these concerns are indeed important when one tries to give a precise account of horizonal contents. Here, however, I shall be content with an intuitive gloss on the notion.

might represent his opponent as knocked down on the ground. However, though the analogy between horizons and expectations is instructive, it must be approached with caution. Hopp emphatically notes that horizonal contents are nonconceptual and that they are characterized by dependency on intuitive contents (Hopp 2011: 76-80, 147-48). There are no doubt expectations that are conceptual and capable of arising independently of one's perceptual experiences; such expectations must be sharply distinguished from horizonal contents.

According to Hopp, to identify the object represented by an experience, we have to consider both its intuitive and horizonal contents (Hopp 2008: 240). In the example above, the intuitive content of my experience was responsible for the fact that the experience at least represented a hand. But what accounted for the additional fact that my experience represented a person with a hand, not just a severed hand floating in the water? The answer is the horizonal content of my experience, which represented a human body to which the hand was attached. If it had represented nothing but water, the hand would have appeared to me as a detached hand. The following thus becomes clear: what an experience represents depends on both what its intuitive content represents and what its horizonal content represents.[5]

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[5] One might find Hopp's choice of the terms "intuitive" and "horizonal" bizarre, but the choice is understandable given the Husserlian background of Hopp's project. Husserl calls any mental states that verify thoughts *intuitions*. As he puts it, thoughts are "'illustrated', or perhaps 'confirmed' or 'fulfilled'… or rendered 'evident'" by intuitions (Husserl [1913a] 1970a: 174). Perceptual experiences are intuitions of the most fundamental kind, and for this reason their contents can be described as "intuitive". As we have seen, however, subjects perceive what they do in part by anticipating what is about to be experienced. Husserl's term for such anticipation is "horizon". What one anticipates is, as it were, on the horizon; it is something that could be, but has not yet been, clearly perceived or intuited. In Husserl's

　　The question we must now ask is how strong such dependence is. As we have seen, Hopp endorses OD. The dependence in question is thus very strong: if two experiences represent different objects, then they either differ in intuitive contents or in horizonal contents. To defend the semantic particularity of perception in Hopp's framework, one has to show that the intuitive and horizonal contents of perception are indeed capable of fixing the perceptual object this way. We will see how Hopp tries to show this in Section III.B. But before that, we will consider Smith's view and examine some of its weaknesses in light of Hopp's theory. Doing so will highlight some of the challenges facing a Husserlian account of semantic particularity.

# III. Semantic Particularity

## A. Smith's Argument and Some Objections

　　A. D. Smith intends to offer a Husserlian argument for externalism, and the version of externalism he focuses on is equivalent to Hopp's OD (Smith 2008: 314-15). In other words, Smith aims to formulate a Husserlian argument for the semantic particularity of perception. Here's the core of his argument (Smith 2008: 330). No perceptual experience is *synthesizable* with an experience that represents a different object. Since the lack of mutual synthesizability entails a difference in representational contents, experiences feature semantic particularity.

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words, a horizon "prescribes a rule for the transition to new actualizing appearances" (Husserl [1966] 2001: 42). If so, the component of perception that represents these "actualizing appearances" can be characterized as "horizonal". For some of Hopp's considerations that motivate his choice of the terminology, see his (Hopp 2010: 7, 16-18).

The centerpiece of this argument is the notion of synthesizability. On Smith's view, two perceptual experiences are synthesizable if they bear contents that represent the same object, but the question, of course, is what it takes for two experiences to do so. To answer the question, Smith draws on *Thing and Space*, in which Husserl speaks of "the synthesis continually joining the manifold perceptions" or "continuous synthesis" (Husserl [1973] 1997: 132). In Smith's words, when continuous synthesis occurs, one undergoes "an *experience of identity*" (Smith 2008: 326). Take two visual experiences of a single watermelon. Smith holds that if I undergo the experiences successively, I will experience the watermelon represented by the second experience as being identical to the watermelon represented by the first experience. In light of this, one can specify a counterfactual requirement that must be satisfied for two experiences to bear contents that represent the same object: if one were to undergo both experiences, one would experience the identity of their objects. This requirement is nicely illustrated by Smith's own example. If I saw a cat both on Monday and on Tuesday, how do we determine whether the perceived cats were identical? Smith's answer is this: "Monday's and Tuesday's cats are the same only if, in uncovering the horizon of Monday's perception, we find a (possible) perception of this cat seen on Tuesday." (Smith 2008: 327)

What then emerges is that the success of Smith's argument turns on whether there really are experiences of identity. More precisely, it turns on whether there is a kind of experience that is a perfect indicator of numerical identity. Smith, following Husserl, gives a positive answer – he takes Husserl's continuous synthesis to be "the synthesis within perception that brings an identical object to givenness" (Smith 2008: 328). My view is that there are no such experiences. The reason is that Smith hasn't said enough to differentiate what he describes as experiences of identity from what

Hopp describes as cases of intuitive fulfillment. However, it is possible for intuitive fulfillment to occur even when one sees a multiplicity of objects, so the so-called "experiences of identity" aren't really reliable indicators of numerical identity.

Let's begin with Hopp's distinction between *epistemic* and *intuitive* fulfillment (Hopp 2011: 205, 191-92). His definition of the former follows the one offered by Husserl, according to whom fulfillment occurs when "[w]e experience how *the same* objective item which was 'merely thought of' in symbol is now presented in intuition, and that it is intuited as being precisely the determinate so-and-so that it was at first merely thought or meant to be." (Husserl [1913b] 1970b: VI, §8, 206) In epistemic fulfillment, therefore, a thought is related to an experience that verifies the thought. By contrast, intuitive fulfillment happens between two perceptual experiences: it takes place when "there is an overlap between past, and presently *retained*, empty horizonal contents and present intuitive ones." (Hopp 2011: 206) As an example, suppose I am riding on a train. Looking out of the window, I see that the moon is partially occluded by a skyscraper. On Hopp's account, my present experience represents the moon by means of both its horizonal and intuitive contents: the former represents the part of the moon behind the skyscraper, while the latter represents the remainder of the moon's facing side. As the train moves, a previously hidden portion of the moon becomes visible to me – this new experience of mine fulfills the horizonal content of my earlier experience. Since no thought is involved in this case, it is an example of intuitive fulfillment.

From Smith's description of experiences of identity, it is hard to see how those experiences consist in anything other than intuitive fulfillment. It is worth quoting Smith's description at length:

> As I walk round an object while keeping my eye on it, formerly hidden aspects come into view. Their sensory presence 'fills' or 'covers' the earlier empty intentions that were, as implicit elements in the perception's intentionality, emptily directed to those parts. The present fulfilled phase of perception is synthesised with the earlier, partially empty phases in a continuing, unbroken sense of the persisting identity of the object. (Smith 2008: 326)

Smith's suggestion here seems to be that we could explain the experienced identity of an object in terms of the experienced identity of its parts. Take an open book on my desk. From where I stand, I can only see its cover, but I do expect the book to contain pages. When I walk around it, I see its pages, so intuitive fulfillment takes place. Smith seems to be making the point that the intuitive contents of the *fulfilling* experiences represent *the same pages* as the horizonal contents of the *fulfilled* experiences. Since they represent the same pages, I experience the pages as remaining the same throughout the process. And since the pages remain a part of the book throughout the process, I also experience the book as remaining the same throughout the process. If this is indeed Smith's suggestion, its main flaw is readily observable: it begs the question. If we can experience the identity of certain pages, we can certainly experience the identity of a book. But the former requires no less than the latter. If the possibility of the latter is in question, we would be going in a circle if we assume the possibility of the former.

At best, the quoted passage by Smith gives us a detailed description of intuitive fulfillment. That would fall short of Smith's goals, however. It is possible for intuitive fulfillment to occur even when we perceive events, but we often perceive events without tracking any particular object.

Suppose I see a bowling ball hitting the pins. At $t_1$, I expect the pins to fall, and they indeed fall at $t_2$. The horizonal contents of my experience at $t_1$ are thus fulfilled by my experience at $t_2$. But from the first-person perspective, it doesn't seem to me that I am tracking any particular object and experience its identity across times. I am not paying attention to any particular pin; I might not even focus on the bowling ball. Or suppose I am watching snow fall.[6] I see countless snowflakes, and my expectation that there will be even more keeps getting fulfilled. Despite this, I do not experience the identity of any particular snowflake. This is not to deny that I could try to track the trajectory of a snowflake; the point is that the horizonal contents of my experience can be fulfilled even if I don't make any such attempts. If so, there are cases of intuitive fulfillment in which the identity of an object is not experienced.

The moral, I submit, is that Smith has not succeeded in showing us that there are experiences of identity. He cannot answer the question: what are the characteristics that experiences of identity have but the other varieties of intuitive fulfillment lack? But without an answer to this question, Smith's synthesizability-based argument cannot establish the semantic particularity of perception. I will therefore turn to Hopp's alternative now.

## B. Hopp's Argument and Some Objections

Hopp takes Smith's argument and formulates a reworked version of it. He employs the Husserlian term "identity-consciousness", which denotes what Smith describes as experiences of identity (Hopp 2011: 181).

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[6] I thank Walter Hopp for suggesting this example.

If Hopp's theory relies on this notion, then his theory suffers the same difficulty facing Smith's. It nonetheless seems to me that not much is lost even if we replace the notion of identity-consciousness with that of intuitive fulfillment when assessing Hopp's view. Therefore, in what follows, I shall present Hopp's view this way.

To clarify the question his account aims to answer, Hopp considers the case of two steel balls, $A$ and $B$, which cannot be discerned from each other by means of perception.[7] In the actual world, one is looking at $A$. However, even if one had been looking at $B$, one could have undergone a visual experience introspectively indistinguishable from one's actual experience, which is about $A$ (Hopp 2011: 173). The question is: given such introspective indistinguishability, in virtue of what can we say that one's actual experience has $A$-representing content instead of $B$-representing content? Hopp has a complicated answer to this question, but the main component of his answer is clearly influenced by Smith's view: one's actual experience of $A$ (henceforth $E_A$) is not synthesizable with one's possible experience of $B$ (henceforth $E_B$), so these two experiences cannot be said to represent the same object (Hopp 2011: 183-84). Hence, even though $E_A$ may be introspectively indistinguishable from $E_B$, $E_A$ still represents $A$, not $B$. Notably, though Hopp's argument from synthesizability is developed from that of Smith's, there are important differences between the two. To appreciate the differences, let's now examine Hopp's argument more closely.

According to Hopp, $E_A$ is synthesizable with $E_B$ if it is possible for

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[7]  Hopp himself assumes that $B$ is qualitatively identical to $A$ (Hopp 2011: 173). Nevertheless, given that the focus is on perceptual experiences here, any imperceptible similarities or differences between the properties of $A$ and $B$ are irrelevant.

one to undergo a series of experiences that meets three conditions: (a) the series begins with $E_A$, (b) the series ends with $E_B$, and (c) given any pair of successive experiences in the series, the later experience fulfills the earlier one (Hopp 2011: 181-82). Suppose I was visually tracking the car my friend was in when he rode the London Eye. At each moment, the horizonal content of my experience represented the position the car would move into at the next moment; since nothing unusual happened, the horizonal contents were all fulfilled. In this case, we say that the experience I underwent at the end of my friend's ride was synthesizable with the experience I underwent at the beginning of the ride.

On Hopp's account, for two experiences to count as representing the same object, they have to meet the requirement of synthesizability. More precisely, they have to meet the requirement *if* there is a continuous path in spacetime such that the subject of the experience can move along the path from where she undergoes one of the experiences to where she undergoes the other (Hopp 2011: 182). [8] This means that Hopp's theory isn't vulnerable to certain easy counterexamples that involve distant objects. If human beings were to lose the technology for space travel, an experience had on the moon wouldn't be synthesizable with an experience had on the earth. However, since the reason would simply be that those on one of the stars couldn't travel to the other, Hopp's theory would still allow the possibility that those two experiences represent the same object.

We can now return to the question about the steel balls: what it is that makes $E_A$ an experience of $A$ rather than an experience of $B$, in spite of the fact that $E_A$ is introspectively indistinguishable from $E_B$? Here's Hopp's

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[8] To handle those cases in which there are no such paths, Hopp introduces the additional criterion of *harmoniousness*. See Hopp 2011:182.

answer: no matter what spatiotemporal path one travels, $E_A$ isn't synthesizable with $E_B$ (Hopp 2011: 184). This is because, for there to be a continuous series of experiences leading from $E_A$ to $E_B$, $B$ has to appear at some point. Let $E^*$ be the experience one undergoes just before $B$'s appearance; there are two cases to consider. In the first case, $B$ appears alongside $A$. Since the horizonal content of $E^*$ represents $A$ as the only steel ball in front of one, the content is not fulfilled. In the second case, $B$ appears after $A$'s disappearance. It follows that there is a short period in which both steel balls are absent. Since the horizonal content of $E^*$ represents the continued presence of a steel ball, the content fails to be fulfilled. We can then conclude that $E_A$ isn't synthesizable with $E_B$.

Is Hopp's argument successful? I shall argue that it is not. As I will try to show in due course, Hopp's argument cannot be made to work unless we are willing to make some problematic metaphysical assumptions. It is therefore my contention that metaphysics is important even when we are talking about perception. Before we get to that part, nonetheless, we have to consider some other objections.

The first objection, of which Hopp himself is aware, is that synthesizability isn't strong enough. Even if two experiences meet the synthesizability requirement, they could still fail to represent the same object. Hopp articulates this worry by presenting a somewhat complicated thought experiment about an eccentric neuroscientist (Hopp 2011: 186). I believe the worry can be highlighted with simpler cases: those involving a switcheroo.[9] Suppose Anton was showing me a magic trick. After laying several playing cards on the table, he asked me to take a look at one of them

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[9] Hopp himself appeals to such cases in arguing against rival views. See Hopp 2011: 180.

without telling him what card it was. I picked a card, identified it as the five of spades and put it back. Then I followed his instruction to stare at the card while he pulled off some seemingly irrelevant tricks. When I was asked to take another look at the card, I realized that unbeknownst to me, the card had been replaced by the ten of clubs. Now consider the perceptual experience I underwent *just before the ten of clubs was revealed*; call it $E_C$. $E_C$ was synthesizable with $E_S$, which was my initial experience of the five of spades. The reason is simple: before the ten of clubs was revealed, I was completely unaware that the card I initially saw had been replaced by the ten of clubs. Hence, if the horizonal content of $E_S$ represented a face-down card being put on the table, the content was fulfilled by the experience that followed. Similarly, if the horizonal content of the latter experience represented a face-down card being moved to the left, the content was again fulfilled. In short, no matter what were represented by the horizonal contents of the experiences linking $E_S$ and $E_C$, all those contents were fulfilled. It follows that $E_S$ and $E_C$ were synthesizable with each other, even though they were about different objects. We are then forced to conclude that synthesizability is too weak.

To forestall objections along these lines, Hopp introduces the additional requirement of *stability*: one's perceptual capacity must function in a stable way. To be more specific, stability consists of two conditions. First, the counterfactual condition says that, even if one's experience were to be followed by a different series of experiences, the synthesizability requirement would still have to be met (Hopp 2011: 186-87). Take the aforementioned example of watching a car of the London Eye. On the assumption that my perceptual capacity was stable, even if I had walked around the London Eye rather than stood still, the horizonal contents of all my experiences would still have been fulfilled. Second, the causal

condition prescribes that one's experience must take place "in a context in which the object itself plays a decidedly important causal role" (Hopp 2011: 187). This condition makes Hopp's theory immune from the challenge posed by Anton's case. Sometime before $E_C$ occurred, Anton substituted the ten of clubs for the five of spades. At that point, the five of spades ceased to play any role in causing my experiences. Consequently, the context in which the series of experiences took place was not one in which a single object remained the cause of my experiences throughout. The stability requirement then entails that that $E_S$ and $E_C$ didn't have identical objects.

The problem with the stability requirement is that its causal condition seems incompatible with Hopp's other commitments. Hopp espouses the thesis of *phenomenological sameness*: "Necessarily, if two experiences have the same phenomenological character, then they have the same content." (Hopp 2011: 172) Together with OD, the thesis entails that the object of an experience is fixed by its phenomenological character. If so, unless Hopp is willing to claim that the cause of an experience is also fixed by the phenomenological character of the experience, the causal condition isn't an option for him. And there are good reasons not to make this claim. In neuroscience, a technique employed to study conscious vision makes use of ambiguous figures (Frith, Perry, and Lumer 1999: 111). Take, for example, the famous duck-rabbit diagram. When looking at the diagram, one could first see a duck and then see a rabbit; such a change could happen even if the diagram itself is not undergoing any change. Ambiguous figures like this are thought to be a helpful guide to the effects neural processes have on consciousness – since the change in one's conscious experience is not brought about by any change in the stimuli causing the experience, it is likely that the change is brought about by something happening in one's

own neural system. If we agree that such a technique is useful, it wouldn't make sense for us to assume any straightforward correspondence between the cause and phenomenological character of an experience.

Rejecting the causal condition of the stability requirement leaves us with the counterfactual condition. In that case, however, I don't see how that the stability requirement solves the problem posed by Anton's case. The counterfactual condition asks us to consider what would have happened if, after undergoing $E_S$, I had done something differently. I could have closed my right eye and tried to track the card with my left eye only, or stood up instead of remaining seated, or moved closer to Anton to take a better look. Insofar as Anton's trick was not interrupted, however, my experiences of the face-down card would have remained indistinguishable from my actual experiences. I would not have become aware that there were in fact two face-down cards; the first had been replaced by the second without my noticing. Furthermore, if my perceptual system was functioning normally, my failure to notice this would be precisely what was supposed to happen – Anton's tricks were designed specifically to trick people with normal vision. It's then clear that in those possible situations, the experiences I underwent after $E_S$ would still be synthesizable with $E_S$. The counterfactual condition of the stability requirement is unable to yield the sought-after verdict that Anton's case is not a counterexample to Hopp's theory.

How should a proponent of Hopp's theory respond? If appealing to the stability requirement doesn't work, maybe the synthesizability requirement can be reinforced. Here's a suggestion of how that might be done. As Jeff Yoshimi points out, an experience may fulfill another to a higher or lower degree, and one's theoretical needs might require one to

focus only on those cases in which the degree of fulfillment goes beyond a set threshold (Yoshimi 2016: 21-22, 15). Adapting this idea to the present context, one could argue that the experiences I had when watching Anton's trick failed to pass the threshold set by the synthesizability requirement. When I underwent $E_S$, the intuitive content of $E_S$ represented the five of spades as a card whose pips were clearly visible. Since intuitive and horizonal contents are closely linked, perhaps we should say that the horizonal content of $E_S$ also represented the five of spades as a card whose pips were clearly visible. But the experience that occurred after $E_S$ had different contents. Since the card was now face-down on the table, the experience that occurred after $E_S$ represented a card whose pips were not clearly visible. One could argue that, as a consequence, this experience didn't sufficiently fulfill the horizonal content of $E_S$. While the experience still represented a playing card, thus providing some fulfillment for $E_S$, the degree of fulfillment was too low—the most important part of the card, i.e. its pips, was not represented. The synthesizability requirement presumably demands a higher degree of fulfillment, even though it is not easy to say exactly what the threshold is. Given these considerations, one could conclude that Anton's case isn't really a counterexample to Hopp's theory.

As I see it, such a defense of Hopp's theory may be sufficient to dispel the worry about Anton's case. Unfortunately, the defense won't solve the problem exposed by a different thought experiment. I will now turn to this thought experiment and argue that Hopp's theory falters on the metaphysics side. The thought experiment can be introduced by modifying Hopp's example of the perceptually indiscernible steel balls *A* and *B*.

Imagine a machine that contains the steel balls *A* and *B*. There is a tiny window on the machine; at any moment, exactly one steel ball can be seen

through the window. The machine is built with a blink detector. Whenever someone looks at the displayed ball and blinks, there is a chance that the machine would replace the displayed ball with the other ball. Whether the replacement process occurs is entirely a random matter, and the time the process takes is always shorter than the time a blink takes. In addition, the machine is designed with an anti-tampering mechanism, so any attempt to remove the steel balls from the machine will result in an explosion that destroys the balls. Call this machine *M*.

If Hopp's synthesizability requirement is to be a sufficient condition for the semantic particularity of perception, then one of the following scenarios must be possible after I see *A* through the window on *M*: either I see both *A* and *B* through the window on *M*, or I see a window with nothing behind during a period after *A*'s disappearance and before *B*'s appearance. On the assumption that *M* was built before I was born, however, neither scenario is possible. Given how rapidly the replacement process takes place, I never undergo any experience other than one that represents a single steel ball behind the window on *M*. Since the process occurs randomly, it is not even possible for me to be sure whether the ball I am seeing is the same one as the one I just saw. Moreover, it won't help if I try to break *M* and take the steel balls out, because *M* was so expertly built that it would require the laws of nature to be broken for one to break *M* without causing an explosion. The design of *M* thus makes sure that in every nomologically possible world, *B* fails to appear alongside *A* (or show up shortly after A's disappearance). This nonetheless doesn't mean that the experiences I undergo when looking at *M* are not synthesizable. Since I always see a steel ball when looking at *M*, the horizonal contents of my experiences are always fulfilled. In addition, they are fulfilled to a very high degree. Given that *A* and *B* are perceptually indiscernible, an experience of *B* would fulfill

the horizonal content of an experience of *A* no less than another experience of *A* would. The case of *M* is thus a counterexample to Hopp's theory – despite the synthesizability of the experiences, they represent different objects.

I believe that the very possibility of *M* shows that Hopp's argument for the semantic particularity of perception is unsuccessful. To undermine my objection, one has to identify a problem with the experiences of *M* or with the possibility of *M*. Taking the first route, one could argue that my experiences of *M* fail to have contents. If so, any experience that does have contents may still feature semantic particularity. I don't think this radical response works. There is nothing unusual about my experiences of *M*; their similarity to everyday experiences justifies the claim that they have contents.

How about the other route? One could argue that while *M* appears to be possible, its possibility is merely apparent. The reason is that, to affirm the possibility of *M*, we have to affirm the possibility that *A* and *B* never show up in front of me at the same time. But the latter possibility is absurd, so we should also reject the former possibility. How does one justify the claim about absurdity? I can think of three ways of doing so. First, one could say that the sentence "necessarily, steel balls *A* and *B* do not show up in front of me at once" is a contradiction. One could indeed say this, but this position would be quite hard to defend. If we translate the sentence into first-order modal logic, it is easy to come up with a model that satisfies the sentence. Define a predicate *F* such that for any object *x*, *Fx* is satisfied at world *w* if and only if *x* is in front of me. To simplify matters, we focus on the following sentence instead of the original one:

(1)    Possibly, there are perceptually indiscernible objects *x* and

> *y* such that necessarily, at most one of *x* and *y* is in front of
> me.[10]

To find a model of (1), we simply identify a pair of objects in the domain of quantification that satisfies the "at most" part of the sentence at the actual world; call them *a* and *b*. Then we define the extension of F to be such that at any world, only one of *a* and *b* is in it. Any resulting model satisfies (1), which means that (1) is not a contradiction.

Second, one could argue that it is a mistake to focus on nomological possibility when evaluating sentence (1). Given the design of *M*, there are no nomologically possible worlds in which I can remove *A* and *B* from *M* without destroying them. However, there are metaphysically possible worlds in which I can do this. Perhaps in one of those worlds, my hunch is infallible, so I can determine which of *A* and *B* is behind the window on *M* without relying on my senses. And perhaps there is another world in which I can bring both *A* and *B* into view by some form of telekinesis without triggering *M*'s anti-tampering mechanism. Given such metaphysical possibilities, sentence (1) is false. I have little sympathy for such a response. But even if the response makes sense, it is not open to phenomenologically-minded philosophers. In *Phenomenological Psychology*, Husserl contends that empirical psychology is constrained by phenomenology. On the one hand, phenomenology is "that a priori science of the subjective to which all

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[10] The intended reading of sentence (1) is the following:

$\Diamond \exists x \exists y \left( Dxy \wedge \Box \left( (Fx \rightarrow \neg Fy) \wedge (Fy \rightarrow \neg Fx) \right) \right)$.

Here the predicate "*D*" stands for the relation *being perceptually indiscernible from*. There are many things we could do to turn sentence (1) into a better translation the original sentence: we could insert a time variable and formalize the indexical "me", for example. Since none of these is particularly important for the present purposes, I choose the simpler translation.

research in the theory of reason ultimately traces back" (Husserl [1962] 1977: 32); on the other hand, "Everywhere, in psychology as well as in natural science, the a priori is merely an irrefrangible, formal border, within which the empirically factual must remain if it is to be at all conceivable, a priori possible." (Husserl [1962] 1977: 36) Now, if we don't hold the actual laws of nature fixed in theorizing about perception, it is hard to see how the results of our theorizing can possibly constrain empirical psychology. Whatever minds are like in a world where I enjoy infallible hunch or possess the power of telekinesis, it makes little sense to suppose that the minds in that world would resemble the actual minds. This means that phenomenologically-minded philosophers should not resort to the metaphysical possibilities under consideration.[11]

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[11]  I have claimed that in the present context, phenomenologists need not be concerned with possibilities that are metaphysically possible but not nomologically possible. But as an anonymous reviewer helpfully points out, there are phenomenological considerations that could motivate the opposite view. Take the famous method of free variation championed by Husserl. It could be tempting to think that, when applied to the present context, the method requires us to take into account all conceivable variations of the perception-object relation. Since the metaphysical possibilities discussed above are conceivable, the method of free variation dictates that phenomenologists should take them seriously. I don't think this is the best way to understand the method of free variation. As Richard Tieszen has convincingly argued, the application of the free variation method requires one to specify the kinds of variations that count as relevant (Tieszen 2005: 158). For example, suppose we are interested in the essential properties of sets. Since multiplying all members of a given set by a constant won't produce a set with different cardinality, cardinality can be regarded as an essential property of sets if we only count the operation of multiplication just mentioned as relevant. Things would be quite different if we take other operations into account. Returning to the issue about the aforementioned metaphysical possibilities, we could ask whether they result from relevant variations of the perception-object relation that

Third, one could try to identify a metaphysical principle that entails the negation of (1). The best I can come up with is the following idea. One could argue that an object's relational properties are in some sense grounded in its intrinsic properties.[12] Hence, whenever two objects share all intrinsic properties, it is *possible* for them to share their relational properties as well, even if they don't *actually* do so. For example, one might think that if steel balls *A* and *B* share all intrinsic properties, then it is possible for them to share the relational property of being smaller than John Smith's head, or that of being the same color as the London Eye, or that of being made by the world's largest steel ball manufacturer, so on and so forth. Now, if we cannot observe any difference between two objects, it is likely that they share most of their intrinsic properties. Combining this with the premise that an object's possible relational properties are closely related to its actual intrinsic properties, one might suggest that perceptual indistinguishability is sufficient for the possible sharing of relational properties. This idea can be stated as follows:

(The Imitation Principle)

Necessarily, for any object *x* and relational property *X*, if *x* has *X*, then it is possible for any object perceptually indiscernible from

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is under consideration. My claim is that they are not, for precisely the reason that phenomenology and empirical psychology must interact in the right sort of ways. My thanks to a reviewer for pressing me on this.

[12] It is not easy to say what exactly separates intrinsic properties from relational ones, but I assume that the distinction makes sense at least at an intuitive level. For an overview of the literature on the distinction, see Marshall and Weatherson (2018).

*x* to have *X* as well.[13]

The imitation principle entails the negation of (1), i.e. the following sentence:

(2)   Necessarily, for any two perceptually indiscernible objects

*x* and *y*, it is possible for both *x* and *y* to be in front of me.[14]

To see this, let *x* be steel ball *A* and *X* be *F*, i.e. the relational property of being in front of me. We know that steel ball *B* is perceptually indiscernible from *A* and *A* is perceptually indiscernible from itself. By the imitation principle, there is a world in which both *A* and *B* bear the property *F*, which is just what (2) says.

The problem is that the imitation principle has disastrous consequences. Suppose we set up a coordinate system whose origin is my right eye. Take the property of being located at point (1, 1, 1) in this coordinate system. This is a relational property, but it is impossible for two physical objects to share this property, whether or not the objects are perceptually indiscernible. The imitation principle is refuted. But perhaps this is too quick; maybe we should say that the imitation principle holds *provided that* the shared relational properties aren't sufficient to make the objects in question coincide spatiotemporally. Unfortunately, this way of weakening the imitation principle won't do. Imagine a particular portion of rubber and call it "Rubber". Suppose one can make exactly one car tire out of Rubber. Then it is impossible for the relational property of being made out of Rubber to be simultaneously exemplified by two car tires; there

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[13]  The intended reading of this sentence is $\Box \forall x \forall X (Xx \to \Diamond \forall y (Dxy \to Xy))$.

[14]  The intended reading of this sentence is $\Box \forall x \forall y (Dxy \to \Diamond (Fx \wedge Fy))$.

simply isn't enough material for two tires. Moreover, such impossibility cannot be explained in terms of spatiotemporal coincidence. Or take the property of functioning as my heart. Consider a case in which my heart is damaged and replaced by an artificial heart. In that case, the artificial heart functions as my heart. However, though it is possible for more than one thing to function as my heart, it is impossible for two things to function as my heart at the same time. The reason has nothing to do with spatiotemporal coincidence – during a heart transplant, the artificial heart might function as my heart when it is outside my body. To salvage the imitation principle in the face of these counterexamples, one has to further weaken the principle. I don't see how that can be done without making *ad hoc* assumptions. Therefore, we should reject the imitation principle.

In conclusion, the possibility of machine *M* seems more than apparent. It is a genuine possibility. If so, however, Hopp's theory fails to establish the semantic particularity of perception. It would nevertheless be a mistake to ignore Hopp's theory—part of the reason is that its theoretical resources shed light on an equally important phenomenon, i.e. the phenomenological particularity of perception. I will now defend this claim.

## IV. Phenomenological Particularity

In her paper, Schellenberg doesn't spend much time on phenomenological particularity. Indeed, it may not be clear why phenomenological particularity should be a topic in its own right. Schellenberg already told us that, insofar as it seems to one that a particular is among the objects experienced by one, one's experience is phenomenologically particular. Isn't this idea perfectly clear? Why else needs to be said? My

answer is that if we carefully consider what it is for one to experience a particular, there is actually a cluster of ideas that might enter the picture. These ideas need to be untangled from each other.

According to Schellenberg, "perception is fundamentally a matter of discriminating and singling out particulars in our environment." (Schellenberg 2016: 29) In elaborating on what "discriminating and singling out particulars" amounts to, she says:

> It is unclear what it would be to perceive a particular without at the very least discriminating and singling it out from its surround. Consider a perceiver who sees a white cup on a desk. He employs his capacity to discriminate white from other colors and to single out white in his environment. Similarly, he employs his capacity to differentiate and single out cup-shapes from, say, computer-shapes and lamp-shapes… Singling out a particular is a proto-conceptual analogue of referring to a particular. (Schellenberg 2016: 36)

It seems to me that at least three phenomena are mentioned in this passage. First, in separating an object from those around it, one's visual system completes figure-ground segregation. In reviewing the work on figure-ground segregation in psychology, Ko Sakai and colleagues say, "The visual system segregates a scene into regions and assigns figure and ground to them. The shape of the region boundary strongly influences the figure-ground segregation." (Sakai et al. 2015: 1) On one construal, therefore, to experience a particular is to perceptually identify a region whose boundary has certain desired characteristics.

Second, in Schellenberg's example of a perceiver's experience, white and cup-shapes are differentiated from the other colors and shapes the

perceiver finds in her surroundings. Needless to say, for the perceiver to experience a white cup, differentiation is not enough – she also needs to group the features together. In doing so, her visual system accomplishes feature-binding. The issue of how this is done is famously known as the "binding problem" in psychology. According to Anne Treisman, "The binding problem in perception deals with the question of how we achieve the experience of a coherent world of integrated objects, and avoid seeing a world of disembodied or wrongly combined shapes, colours, motions, sizes and distances." (Treisman 1998: 1295) The remark points out another way to conceptualize phenomenological particularity: to experience particulars is to divide the perceived environmental features into mutually exclusive groups.

Third, Schellenberg takes the perception of a particular to pave the way for linguistic reference. But what does it take to turn an object into a potential target for linguistic reference? My suggestion is that doing so requires the awareness of a property-bearer. Just as we should distinguish between reference and predication when talking about language, we should differentiate the awareness of a property-bearer from the awareness of properties when talking about perception. Seeing a pumpkin requires more than seeing all of its properties that are visible to me. This means that there is yet another way phenomenological particularity can be construed: to experience a particular is to experience a property-bearer that has the properties presently perceived by one.

It should be clear by now that when we talk about phenomenological particularity, we need to be explicit about which of the three phenomena above we have in mind. It could be the case that one of them is always accompanied by another; even so, the issues of how these phenomena

should be understood can at least be conceptually separated. What I am especially interested in is the third issue, i.e. how we are to make sense of the awareness of property-bearers. There is something phenomenologically puzzling about the claim that we perceive the bearers of properties. Consider again my experience of seeing a pumpkin. If I can be said to see both roundness and a bearer of roundness, it's certainly not the case that I see both of them in the sense of seeing both roundness and orange, for example. In what sense, then, do I perceive both roundness and its bearer? The question I would like to explore here can be stated in more general terms:

(The Question of Experiencing Proper-Bearers, henceforth QEP)

What is the phenomenological difference between the perceptual experience of a property and the perceptual experience of its bearer?

In the remainder of the paper, I will argue that a satisfactory answer to QEP can be found by combining Hopp's theory of perception with insights from John Campbell and Peter Simons.

Let's begin by considering a distinction drawn by Campbell. Building on the work of Huang and Pashler (2007), Campbell argues that *selection* must be distinguished from *access*: "Grabbing the thing out from its background (selection) is one thing, and characterizing it (access) is another." (Campbell 2014: 54)[15] Take the example of seeing a hand in

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[15] I will combine Hopp's and Campbell's ideas below, but some might worry that doing so would give rise to a chimera. The project of understanding perceptual experiences in terms of their representational contents is celebrated by Hopp but vehemently opposed by Campbell. Despite this, however, one can endorse the selection-access distinction without sharing Campbell's commitments. There is thus nothing self-contradictory in combining the distinction with Hopp's view.

Section III.B. Suppose I first became aware of the hand in the lake by noticing something grey near my kayak. In this case, I *selected* the hand on the basis of the property *grey*. I could then go on to *access* the other properties of the hand: that it's floating, hand-shaped and covered in blood, etc. Of course, things could have gone in the reverse order. It could have been the case that I first noticed the hand by seeing a hand-shaped object near my kayak and, upon a closer look, realized that it was grey.[16]

The selection-access distinction suggests a useful way to think about the relation between the perception of a property and the perception of the object that bears the property. Take the hand again: if I selected the hand on the basis of the property *grey*, my experience of the hand was caused by my experience of grey. On Campbell's view, we should then say that the hand was experienced under the mode of presentation *grey object* (Campbell 2014: 53, 64). This reflects the special role played by my awareness of grey in my perception of the hand. I could go on to access the other properties of the hand, but—to use Campbell's phrase—I would never have to grab the hand out again. The hand was grabbed out the moment I experienced something grey in the lake—what remained to be done was to specify the additional properties of the grey thing. Therefore, compared with the properties experienced in this later process of specification, the property of being grey was experienced as more

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[16] Note that I use the word "notice" in a loose, intuitive sense. It should not be assumed that the word is synonymous with a related word used by Campbell, i.e. "attend". Campbell seems to have a very specific notion of attention in mind. For example, he writes, "A tiger padding through the veldt may be able to distinguish its prey from the foliage because of the colour of its target; but that does not mean that the tiger has any interest in the colour of things… The tiger may be incapable of *attending* to the colour of the object, even though it uses the colour of the thing to *select* the object from its background." (Campbell 2014: 61, my italics) The passage seems to imply that Campbell contrasts attention with selection and equates it with access. This is not how I intend to use the word "notice".

intimately bound up with the experience of the hand itself.

Though Campbell's analysis provides important clues to an answer of QEP, his analysis doesn't count as such an answer by itself. QEP is the question of how, from the first-person perspective, I should characterize the relation between my experience of grey and my experience of a grey object. Saying that the former causes the latter doesn't tell us much about what it is like to undergo the experiences that arise in such a causal process. To adapt Campbell's insight for my purposes, we need to supply additional details about what exactly is experienced when a property-bear is experienced and how such an experience occurs.

I suggest that we do so by invoking tropes. *Tropes* are particular instances of properties such as the temperature in my room and the whiteness of the London Eye. A useful way to conceptualize tropes is provided by Peter Simons, who takes them to be "a kind of dependent concrete particular" (Simons 1994: 557). Tropes are dependent because they don't exist on their own, and they are concrete in that they have spatiotemporal locations. Given the particularity of tropes, it has been claimed that tropes, rather than universals, are what we represent in perception (Lowe 2006: 23).

My answer to QEP can be stated in terms of tropes. The phenomenological difference between the experiences of a property and its bearer lies in the following: to experience a property in perception is to represent a trope, but to experience the bearer of a property is to represent a *foundational system*. The notion of such a system is, again, Simons'. A foundational system is any bundle of tropes such that the tropes depend on

each other but not on anything outside the bundle (Simons 1994: 562).[17] Take a pyramid in Egypt and consider a bundle of tropes such that for any trope *x*, *x* is in the bundle if and only if (a) *x* is an instance of a property exemplified by the pyramid, and (b) *x* is located where the pyramid is located. For example, if the pyramid is beige, then the bundle contains a beige trope. On Simons' view, the bundle counts as a foundational system provided that the tropes in it depend on, and *only* on, each other. This condition is indeed satisfied. Since there are no such things as independently existing colors, the beige trope in the bundle depends on some other tropes in the bundle, such as a mass trope. Similarly for the other tropes in the bundle. But none of these tropes depends on things outside the bundle—so long as the mass trope in the bundle continues to exist, for example, the beige trope in the bundle can continue to exist. It follows that the bundle is a foundational system. And to the extent that the pyramid can be identified with the bundle, the pyramid itself is a foundational system.

On my proposal, one perceives a property-bearer that has property *F* if, by perceiving an *F* trope, one selects a foundational system to which the *F* trope belongs—here the relevant notion of "selection" is of course Campbell's. For example, suppose Carl becomes aware of a triangular object when he notices the triangularity trope that is the triangular shape of the aforementioned pyramid. Applying the present proposal to this case, we can say that by experiencing the triangularity trope, Carl selects a foundational system of which the triangularity trope is a member. In doing so, he becomes aware of the bearer of triangularity, which he could go on

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[17] Actually, the definition of a foundational system is more complicated than that. The definition mentioned here is a simplified one, which, for my purposes, is sufficient.

to identify as a pyramid if he ends up accessing enough of the pyramid's properties to tell what it is. Given this view, it is clear how we should answer QEP, which is the following question: what is the pheno-menological difference between the experience of the property *triangularity* and the experience of a bearer of triangularity? The answer is: what is experienced in the former experience is a trope that is only a member of what is experienced in the latter experience.[18]

What remains to be done is to say how exactly foundational systems are experienced. This is where Hopp's theory of intuitive and horizonal contents comes in. In the above example, for Carl's experience to represent a foundational system, it has to represent some members of the system other than the triangularity trope. The experience has to represent some tropes with which the triangularity trope co-exists. How are those tropes represented? I suggest that they are represented by the horizonal contents of Carl's experience. Upon seeing the triangularity trope, Carl comes to expect the existence of other environmental features. For example, he expects that as the experience unfolds, he will be able to tell whether the perceived triangle is actually a three-dimensional object, not just a two-dimensional figure. Such expectations manifest themselves in the horizonal

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[18] I state my proposal in terms of tropes because I think a trope-based ontology enjoys many theoretical advantages both in metaphysics and in philosophy of mind. Needless to say, not everyone would be happy with tropes. Some would prefer to affirm universals but reject tropes. My proposal need not contradict such views. Those preferring such views presumably have to agree that universals are more than denizens of a Platonic heaven; they also have locations in space and time (or are capable of being instantiated at locations in space and time). This means that it is possible for universals to be spatiotemporally co-located. If so, insofar as one acknowledges dependence relations between co-located universals, my proposal can be stated in terms of such relations.

contents of his experience, which represent a volume trope that co-exists with the triangularity trope. But Carl expects more than a volume trope. He also expects that, with more time passing, the surface texture of the triangular object will be more clearly seen. It follows that the horizonal contents of his experience also represent a texture trope that co-exists with the triangularity and volume tropes. In short, in virtue of such horizonal contents, Carl experiences the triangularity trope together with some other tropes that bear dependence relations to the triangularity trope. Because of this, even before Carl is able to tell that the perceived triangular object is a pyramid, there is a phenomenological difference between his experience of the triangular object and the property of triangularity borne by the object. Without the horizonal contents, there wouldn't be any such difference.

One might object that there are is a lacuna in my reasoning: the horizonal contents of an experience might represent certain co-existing tropes, but it is a stretch to say that they represent tropes that depend on each other. This is a fair point. However, while I don't have any knockdown argument, I think the possibility of experiencing mutually dependent tropes is attested by a variety of everyday experiences. For example, if Albrecht suddenly notices something moving towards him, he will try to dodge even before he can tell what it is. What contents should we attribute to Albrecht's visual experience to make sense of his action? It won't do to say that his experience represents a motion trope independently of any other tropes. What is moving could be a plastic bag blowing in the wind, which wouldn't hurt Albrecht even if he is hit. Motion itself doesn't pose any threats. The better explanation is to say that Albrecht's experience represents a foundational system that, in addition to a motion trope, may very well contain a solidity trope. The motion trope is perceived to depend on the solidity trope – the motion is perceived as the motion of something solid.

For this reason, the perception of the motion trope prompts Albrecht's attempt to dodge. Or consider a wooden book box that looks exactly like a real book. Edmund sees it and mistakes it for a real copy of a science fiction that he wants to read, so he reaches for it. While the intuitive contents of Edmund's experience may represent nothing more than the cover-looking surface of the book box, he expects there to be text inside. His experience thus represents both a cover trope and a text trope, which are tropes that depend on each other to make up a book (together with several other tropes). In this case, Edmund's experience represents a foundational system whose members include the two mutually dependent tropes, among others. It then emerges that such examples are not hard to come by. If so, it makes sense to speak of perceptual experiences that represent foundational systems and appeal to such experiences in explaining how we perceive property-bearers.

## V. Conclusion

I have tried to argue that Hopp's theory sheds much light on the issue of phenomenological particularity. According to the proposal pursued here, an important aspect of phenomenological particularity is the experience of property-bearers. Though the idea of experiencing property-bearers may seem puzzling at first, the puzzlement diminishes if we get clear on the fact that the contents of a perceptual experience are not exhausted by its intuitive contents. What is experienced through the intuitive contents of an experience is always a trope that appears among many other tropes; the latter tropes are experienced through the horizonal contents of one's experience. In perception, therefore, we experience properties that depend on trope bundles – these trope bundles appear as the bearers of the experienced properties. This is the Husserlian conception of phenomenological particularity that I hope to recommend in this paper.

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# 知覺的個殊性：
# 一個現象學的視角

## 陳貴正

中央研究院歐美研究所

地址：11529 台北市南港區研究院路二段 128 號

E-mail: ckueichen@gmail.com

## 摘要

　　本文的主題是關懷現象學傳統的哲學家應如何理解知覺的個殊性 (perceptual particularity)。Susanna Schellenberg (2016) 以此概念描述知覺經驗使人感知個殊物 (particulars) 的性質。舉例而言，若我正看著一顆南瓜，則我可能會察覺到該南瓜具有「橘色」、「圓形」等性質——但這些該南瓜與其他南瓜共享的性質不會是我所經驗到的全部。我也將經驗到擁有這些可共享性質的個體，亦即作為個殊物的該南瓜。近期在心智哲學中針對這種關於個殊物的經驗有不少討論，但我們也應探問現象學學者對這種經驗所能提出的分析。在此，我將批判地檢視 A. D. Smith (2008) 與 Walter Hopp (2011) 所主張的胡塞爾式知覺理論，藉以探究如何參考胡塞爾現象學的視角而去分析知覺的個殊性。我主張，雖然 Smith 與 Hopp 嘗試使用胡塞爾式的概念工具來討論 Schellenberg 形容為語義性質 (semantic) 的個殊性現象，

但這些概念工具並無法有效地處理此一議題。若要用更為理想的方式使用這些概念工具，我們應該以之分析 Schellenberg 形容為現象學性質 (phenomenological) 的個殊性現象。我將討論現象學個殊性所涉及的複雜議題，並嘗試在 Hopp 的理論基礎之上提出對該現象的分析。

**關鍵詞：知覺個殊性、語義個殊性、現象學個殊性、胡塞爾現象學**